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JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann, Section 35-1-85 (CodeCo 1986) and Rule 3 of 
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals (CodeCo 1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Kennecott Copper Corporation ("Kennecott") presents on 
appeal the following issues; 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission had jurisdiction 
to make an award to Applicant for workers1 compensation benefits 
with regard to his injuries of September, 1961 through November, 
1976, notwithstanding the fact that Applicant did not give notice 
to the Industrial Commission within either three years of the 
date of the injuries or the date of last payment of compensation 
for those injuries or within eight years of the date of the 
injuries, if tolled, as required under Utah Code Ann, Section 
35-1-100 (CodeCo 1986), 
2. Whether, as a matter of law, there was a factual 
basis upon which the Industrial Commission could support the 
finding of fact and conclusion of law that Applicant had complied 
with the notice requirements under Utah Code Ann, Sections 
35-1-99 and 35-1-100 (CodeCo 1986) with regard to his injuries 
incurred between September, 1961 and November, 1976. 
3. Whether the Industrial Commission had authority to 
make an award to Applicant for workers1 compensation benefits 
with regard to his injuries incurred between September, 1961 and 
November, 1976, notwithstanding the fact that Applicant did not 
file a claim for compensation within the statute of limitations 
period imposed under Utah Code Ann, Section 35-1-99 (CodeCo 
1986). 
4. Whether Kennecott was denied due process of law 
with regard to the Industrial Commission's award, since Kennecott 
was given no notice prior to the hearing that the Commission 
would consider Kennecott's liability in connection with 
Applicant's injuries from September, 1966 through June, 1984 and, 
therefore, was not provided with the opportunity to prepare an 
adequate defense. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann, Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100, relied 
upon by Kennecott are attached hereto as Appendices A and B, 
respectively, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(6) of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals (CodeCo 1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Order issued on January 14, 1987 by the Indus-
trial Commission through its Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") 
Timothy C. Allen and the Commission's affirmance thereof on March 
6, 1987. In the January 14, 1987 decision, the ALJ ordered 
Kennecott to pay 100% of the total benefits payable to Applicant, 
based on a finding that Kennecott was responsible for all of 
Applicant's injuries from 1961 through 1984. On or about 
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February 11, 1987, Kennecott, in accordance with Utah Code Ann, 
Section 35-1-82.55 (CodeCo 1986) filed a Motion for Review 
requesting review and reconsideration by the Industrial Commis-
sion of the Order of January 14, 1987, awarding benefits. On 
March 6, 1987r the Industrial Commission denied Kennecott's 
Motion for Review and upheld the ALJ's award to Applicant. 
Therefore, this appeal is taken from the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order by the ALJ issued on January 
14, 1987, and Order Denying Motion for Review by the Industrial 
1 
Commission issued on March 6, 1987 (collectively referred to as 
the "Orders"). Copies of these Orders are attached hereto as 
Appendices C and D, respectively. Kennecott*s Petition for 
Review of the Industrial Commission Award was filed with this 
Court on April 3, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Applicant Angelo Maldonado was employed by Kennecott 
from May 31, 1961, until October 1, 1985, at which time he was 
placed on the company-sponsored permanent and total disability 
pension based on an occupational hearing loss. Applicant was 
first employed as a laborer for Kennecott and later employed as a 
puncher. As a puncher, Applicant was required to keep air vents 
1
 The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order entered 
by the ALJ and subsequently adopted by the Industrial Commission 
in its Order Denying Motion for Review are hereinafter referred 
to as the Findings and Conclusions of the Commission. 
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under the furnace clean. On September 21, 1961, Applicant, while 
working on the No. 2 Converter, slipped and sustained an injury 
to his lower back and neck. He was assisted to the Kennecott 
Clinic where his lower back and neck were treated for a period of 
two weeks. Thereafter, Applicant returned to work. 
On or about March 21, 1986, Applicant filed an Applica-
tion for Hearing ("Application") with the Industrial Commission, 
requesting compensation for injuries sustained during the course 
of his employment on September 21, 1961. Although notice of 
Applicant's 1961 injury was given to Kennecott within one year 
from the date of the accident as required by Utah Code Ann. 
Section 35-1-99 (CodeCo 1986), neither notice of injury was given 
nor claim of compensation made with regard to the 1961 injury to 
the Industrial Commission within the prescribed limitations 
period under Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100 (CodeCo 
1986). 
During the course of the hearing, scheduled on 
August 20, 1986 to hear testimony regarding the September 21, 
1961 injury, the ALJ informed Kennecott, despite no notice to 
Kennecott prior to the hearing, that Applicant's case appeared to 
be a claim for permanent and total disability and that testimony 
would be heard on all of Applicant's injuries incurred as a 
result of his employment with Kennecott, including the hearing 
loss. In response to inquiries by the ALJ, Applicant testified 
to additional injuries on September 22, 1966, January 21, 1971, 
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November 7, 1976, March 6, 1980, November 18, 1982, April 26, 
1983 and June 20, 1984. 
Kennecott agrees that Applicant's filing of the March, 
1986 Application satisfied the notice requirement to the Indus-
trial Commission under Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-100 (CodeCo 
1986) for the industrial injuries which occurred on November 18, 
1982, April 26, 1983 and June 20, 1984. Kennecott further agrees 
that Applicant's claim filed on March 21, 1986, satisfied the 
statute of limitations under Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-99 
(CodeCo 1986) for his industrial injuries of 1982, 1983 and 1984. 
Since Applicant gave notice of the November 18, 1982, April 26, 
1983 and June 20, 1984 injuries to both his employer and the 
Industrial Commission within the prescribed time limitations set 
forth under Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100 (CodeCo 
1986), the Industrial Commission had the requisite jurisdiction 
to make an award of compensation with respect to Applicant's 
1982, 1983 and 1984 injuries. 
Although Applicant gave notice of his injuries between 
September, 1966 and November, 1976 to Kennecott within the 
one-year time requirement, there exists no evidence in the record 
that Applicant gave notice to or made a claim for compensation 
with the Industrial Commission with respect to those injuries, as 
required under Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100 
(CodeCo 1986). Moreover, Kennecott has never provided any 
temporary total, temporary partial, permanent partial or 
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permanent total compensation for any of the injuries sustained by 
Applicant between September, 1961 and November, 1976. 
Adopting the findings of the Medical Panel, the Commis-
sion found that Applicant had sustained a 10% permanent partial 
impairment relating to his injuries between September, 1961 and 
June, 1984. This impairment rating is based upon Applicant's 
having sustained a 5% permanent partial impairment due to the 
injury of September 21, 1961, a 1% permanent partial impairment 
due to the injury of September 22, 1966, a 2% permanent partial 
impairment due to the injury of November 16, 1976, a 1% permanent 
partial impairment due to the injury of November 18, 1982 and a 
1% permanent partial impairment due to the injury of June 20, 
1984. The Commission, further adopting the findings of the 
Medical Panel, found a 3% permanent partial impairment with 
regard to Applicant's industrial-related hearing loss. The 
Commission further found a 4% impairment due to arthritis in 
Applicant's knee as a result of pre-existing conditions. Having 
found no permanent aggravation of Applicant's pre-existing knee 
problems in the injuries of 1961 through 1984, the Commission 
found no liability against the Second Injury Fund. The Commis-
sion ordered Kennecott to pay 100% of the total benefits payable 
to Applicant, based on a finding that Kennecott was responsible 
for all of Applicant's injuries from 1961 through 1984. 
However, Kennecott objects to the Commission's findings 
of fact and legal conclusion that Kennecott is responsible for 
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Applicant's total impairment relating to his injuries from 
September, 1961 through November, 1976. The Commission lacked 
jurisdiction to make an award to Applicant for compensation with 
regard to those injuries. Accordingly, the percentage of 
Applicant's total impairment (61.5%) relating to Applicant's 
injuries between September, 1961 and November, 1976 should be 
regarded as pre-existing injuries and, therefore, the responsi-
bility of the Second Injury Fund. See Utah Code Ann, Section 
35-1-69 (CodeCo 1986). 
Furthermore, Kennecott contends that the portion of the 
Commission's Order that imposes liability on Kennecott for 
Applicant's injuries between September, 1966 and June, 1984, 
without prior notice to Kennecott, was made without due process 
of law as guaranteed by the Federal and State Constitutions and, 
therefore, should be set aside by this Court. 
Thus, unlike the position taken in Kennecott v. 
2 
Industrial Commission and Kenneth Davis (Case No, 860228-CA), a 
case argued before this Court on April 29, 1987, Kennecott 
z
 Although the legal issues raised in Maldanado are virtually 
identical to those raised in Davis, there are factual distinc-
tions between the two cases that necessitate a slightly different 
outcome. In Davjjs, Kennecott objected on jurisdictional and con-
stitutional grounds to the imposition of liability with regard to 
applicant's injuries in 1969 and 1976, but Kennecott did not 
contest liability arising from applicant's claim of compensation 
for his injury of September, 1984 since it was the injury for 
which he actually filed a claim. Furthermore, notice of that 
claim was given to Kennecott in a timely manner. However, in 
Maldanado, Kennecott contests Applicant's claim of compensation 
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contends in the instant matter that the Commission's Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order must be set aside by this 
Court in its entirety on jurisdictional and/or constitutional 
grounds. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann, Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100 clearly 
mandate that an applicant notify his employer within one year 
from the date of an industrial accident, and that a claim for 
compensation or notice be given to the Commission within either 
three years of the date of the accident or the date of the last 
payment of compensation for that accident, or within eight years 
of the date of the accident, if tolled. Failure on the part of 
an applicant to satisfy both requirements with regard to a 
particular industrial injury effectively bars the Commission from 
asserting jurisdiction over a claim of compensation for that 
injury. 
In the instant matter, Applicant gave no notice of his 
injuries between September, 1961 and November, 1976 to the 
Commission. Applicant further failed to make a claim of compen-
sation before the Commission within the required time period from 
for his September, 1961 injury, the injury which formed the basis 
of his actual written claim, on jurisdictional grounds as well as 
the imposition of liability for Applicant's injuries between 1966 
and 1984 on jurisdictional and/or constitutional grounds because 
Kennecott had no notice of these injuries in the claim* 
-8-
3 
the date of the injuries. Accordingly, the Commission never 
obtained jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-100 so as 
to have authority to compensate Applicant at Kennecott's expense 
for the injuries between September, 1961 and November, 1976. 
Having never obtained jurisdiction over Applicant's previous 
injuries, the Commission acted without or in excess of its 
authority in affirming the compensation award based, in part, on 
those injuries. The award, having in part been made in disregard 
and in violation of the jurisdictional requirements as estab-
lished and followed by the Utah Supreme Court in its interpreta-
tions of Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100 of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act, should therefore be set aside. 
Furthermore, in order for the Commission to reach the 
conclusion that Kennecott is responsible to pay workers' compen-
sation benefits for Applicant's injuries between September, 1961 
and November, 1976, the Commission would have to make a finding 
of fact that Applicant complied with the notice requirements 
under Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100. The Commis-
sion, however, made no findings of fact as to whether Applicant 
gave notice to or filed a claim for compensation with the Commis-
sion within the prescribed time period. Indeed, there is no 
evidence in the record which would have allowed the Commission to 
3
 In fact, with the exception of his September 21, 1961 
injury, Applicant has never made a claim of compensation for his 
injuries between September, 1961 and June, 1984. 
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make such findings. With the exception of his September, 1961 
injury, Applicant never filed a claim for compensation with the 
Commission for those injuries. Thus, there exists no factual 
basis to support the legal conclusion that the Commission had 
obtained jurisdiction over Applicants injuries between Septem-
ber, 1961 and November, 1976 so as to justify its imposition of 
liability on Kennecott for those injuries. Furthermore, the 
Commission's failure to make the required findings of fact is 
reversible error and, therefore, the award must be set aside. 
Moreover, the Commission's decision in this matter com-
pletely ignores the period of limitation established under Utah 
Code Ann. Section 35-1-99 (CodeCo 1986). Since Applicant has not 
filed a timely claim for compensation for his injuries between 
September, 1961 and November, 1976, Applicant's right to compen-
sation for those injuries is wholly barred under Section 35-1-99. 
Finally, the hearing that took place on August 20, 
1986, before the ALJ, which gave rise to the award of the Commis-
sion, was for injuries resulting from Applicant's accident in 
September, 1961. Kennecott had no notice prior to the hearing 
that the Commission would consider Kennecott's liability with re-
gard to Applicant's injuries from September, 1966 through June, 
1984 and, therefore, was unable to adequately prepare a defense. 
Accordingly, Kennecott has been denied procedural due process of 
law in connection with the compensation award to Applicant for 
his injuries between September, 1966 and June, 1984 and, there-
•10-
fore, the award should be set aside, in part, on constitutional 
grounds. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SINCE APPLICANT FAILED EITHER TO GIVE TIMELY 
NOTICE TO OR TO FILE A CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION 
WITH THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FOR HIS IN-
JURIES BETWEEN SEPTEMBER, 1961 AND NOVEMBER, 
1976, THE COMMISSION LACKED JURISDICTION TO 
AWARD COMPENSATION TO APPLICANT FOR THOSE 
INJURIES. 
The Commission lacked jurisdiction to award compensa-
tion to Applicant for his injuries between Septemer, 1961 and 
November, 1976. The Commission, a fortiori, had no authority to 
impose libility on Kennecott for those injuries. Utah Code Ann. 
S 35-1-100 (CodeCo 1986), which establishes jurisdictional 
requirements that must be satisfied before the Commission can 
hear a claim for compensation, provides: 
Whenever an employee sustains an accident 
arising out of or in the course of his 
employment, the employee shall file with the 
Commission, in writing, notice of such 
accident, with a copy to the employer; if 
such notice is so filed within three years of 
the time of the accident or within the time 
limitation provided in Section 35-1-99, the 
Commission shall obtain jurisdiction to make 
its award when the injury becomes apparent. 
[Emphasis added.] 
The requirements of Section 35-1-100 must be read in 
conjunction with those of Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-99 (CodeCo 1986), 
which establishes a statute of limitations for all claims of 
"compensation" filed with the Commisson: 
If no claim for compensation is filed with 
the Industrial Commission within three years 
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from the date of the accident or the date of 
the last payment of compensation, the right 
to compensation is wholly barred. 
However, the filing of a report or notice of 
accident or injury with the Industrial 
Commission, the employer, or its insurance 
carrier, together with the payment of any 
compensation benefit or the furnishing of 
medical treatment by the employer or an 
insurance carrier, tolls the period for 
filing the claim until the employer or its 
carrier notifies the employee, in writing, of 
its denial of liability or further liability 
for the industrial accident or injury, with 
instructions upon the notification of denial 
to the employee to contact the Industrial 
Commission for further advice or assistance 
to preserve or protect the employee's rights. 
Claims for compensation in any event shall be 
filed within eight years after the date of 
the accident. [Emphasis added.] 
Read together, Sections 35-1-100 and 35-1-99 clearly 
mandate that an employee claiming to have sustained an injury 
arising out of or in the course of his employment notify his 
employer within one year from the date of the alleged industrial 
accident. Moreover, the employee must either give notice to or 
make a claim for compensation with the Commission within either 
three years of the date of the accident or the date of the last 
payment of compensation for that accident, or within eight years 
of the date of the accident, if tolled. Failure to satisfy both 
notice requirements with regard to an industrial injury effec-
tively precludes the Commission from asserting jursidiction to 
hear a claim of compensation for said injury. See Dean Evans 
Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah 1984), aff'd 
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in Mecham v. Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d 783, 785 (Utah 
1984). 
These provisions place the burden of giving notice to 
the Commission squarely on the employee. Thus, Applicant in the 
instant matter clearly had the duty to give the Commission notice 
of his injuries between September, 1961 and November, 1976. 
Having failed to impart the requisite notice on the Commission, 
the Commission is precluded from asserting jurisdiction to hear a 
claim of compensation for Applicant's injuries between September, 
1961 and November, 1976. Any award of compensation premised on 
those injuries, whether made directly or indirectly in connection 
with an award of another injury, is therefore barred by Utah Code 
Ann, Section 35-1-100. To conclude otherwise would be contrary 
to both the literal language of Utah Code Ann, Section 35-1-100, 
as well as Utah Supreme Court decisions interpreting this provi-
sion. See Peterson v. Industrial Commission. 29 Utah 2d 446, 511 
P.2d 721 (Utah 1973); Gardner v. Industrial Commission, 30 Utah 
2d 377, 517 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1973). 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that the 
Commission has no authority to assert jurisdiction to hear a 
claim for compensation when an applicant has failed to give 
notice to or file a claim for compensation with the Commission 
within the prescribed limitations period for that injury. In 
Peterson v, Industrial Commission. 29 Utah 2d 446, 511 P.2d 721 
(Utah 1973), claimant sought review of an order of the Commission 
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that adopted the conclusion of the ALJ that his claim for compen-
sation and benefits was barred by Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-99. 
In that matter, claimant was injured in the course of his employ-
ment in February, 1964. No claim had been filed with the Commis-
sion because the insurance carrier for the claimant's employer 
admitted liability for coverage and paid expenses in connection 
with the temporary disability. The insurance carrier filed a 
report of injury with the Commission on August, 1966. In Septem-
ber, 1971, claimant filed with the Commission an application for 
benefits relating to an aggravation of the 1964 industrial 
injury. The Commission denied the request for hearing and 
dismissed the matter on the basis that the statute of limitations 
4 
had expired under Utah Code Ann, Section 35-1-99. Affirming the 
Commission, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
The filing of a final report by insurance 
carriers is mandatory and does not, nor is it 
intended to, confer any jurisdiction of the 
settled matter upon the Industrial Commis-
sion. 
Since the jurisdiction of the Industrial 
Commission was not attempted to be invoked 
for more than three years after the last 
payment was made, the statute had run, and 
the Commission was correct in refusing to 
grant a hearing in the matter. 
Peterson, 29 Utah 2d at 448, 511 P.2d at 722. Since Applicant in 
4
 The eight-year tolling period under Utah Code Ann. Section 
35-1-99 became effective on May 21, 1981 and, therefore, was not 
a subject of consideration in Peterson. See Ch. 287, S 6, Laws 
of Utah 1981. 
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the instant matter failed to file any notice of injury or claim 
for compensation with the Commission within the prescribed 
limitations period as established by Utah Code Ann, Sections 
35-1-100 and 35-1-99 (CodeCo 1986) for the injuries between 
September, 1961 and November, 1976, the Industrial Commission 
lacked the requisite jurisdiction to make an award of workers' 
compensation benefits. Furthermore, the statutory requirement 
under Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-97 (CodeCo 1986) that an employer 
file a report of injury with the Commission, like the final 
report by the insurer, does not confer, nor is intended to 
confer, jurisdiction upon the Commission. Thus, the failure of 
Kennecott, if any, to file a report of injury in this case has 
absolutely no bearing on the issue of Applicant's failure to file 
a claim for compensation within the time allowed by Utah Code 
Ann. Section 35-1-99 (CodeCo 1986).5 
Similarly, in Gardner v. Industrial Commission, 30 Utah 
2d 377, 517 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1973), an employee sought review of a 
Commission order awarding the claimant compensation for an 
alleged industrial injury sustained in July, 1968. In that 
matter, no notice of the injury had been given to the Commission 
until February, 1972. In March 1972, claimant filed an 
D
 The Commission contends in its Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law and Order that Kennecott's alleged failure to file a 
report with the Commission as required by Utah Code Ann. Section 
35-1-97 caused there to be no notice of Applicant's injuries 
between September 1961 and November, 1976 with the Commission. 
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application for hearing with the Commission seeking further 
compensation some three years and seven months after the accident 
and some three years and four months after the last payment of 
compensation. Reversing the Commission order awarding compensa-
tion, the Utah Supreme Court concluded: 
The petitioners here simply urge that under 
the facts of this case, the applicant did not 
file his claim within the statutory time, 
either from the date of accident or the date 
of last compensation standpoint since three 
years passed in either case, before applica-
tion was filed, and thus has no basis for 
receiving the requested compensation, — with 
which we agree. 
Gardner, 30 Utah 2d at 378, 517 P.2d at 1330. See Mannes-Vale 
Inc. v. Vale, 717 P.2d 709 (Utah 1986) (since applicant's claim 
for compensation had not been filed within the stautory three-
year period as required by Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-99, the 
Commission therefore had no jurisdiction to make any further 
award of compensation). See also Jones v. Industrial Commission, 
17 Utah 2d 28, 404 P.2d 27 (1965) and Frederickson v. Industrial 
Commission, 19 Utah 2d 233, 429 P.2d 981 (1967) (claim for 
medical expenses, relating to an earlier industrial injury, 
denied on the grounds that no claim had been filed with the 
b
 Similarly, the eight-year tolling period under Utah Code 
Ann. Section 35-1-99, which became effective on May 12, 1981, did 
not apply to the Gardner matter. See Ch. 287, S 6, Laws of Utah 
1981. 
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cantfs testimony at the August 20, 1986 hearing, the Commission 
has been given notice of those injuries within the prescribed 
limitations period and, therefore, arguably has obtained juris-
dication over t h^p i r es. 
-1 7-
wholly barred under Utah Code Ann, Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100 
(CodeCo 1986). 
In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
the Commission takes the position that had Kennecott filed an 
"Employer's First Report of Injury" with the Commission as 
required under Utah Code Ann, Section 35-1-97 (CodeCo 1986), the 
Commission would have had notice of Applicant's injuries between 
September, 1961 and November, 1976, and therefore, proper juris-
diction to hear Applicant's claim for compensation in connection 
with those injuries. The Commission's Order intimates that 
Kennecott's compliance with Utah Code Ann, Section 35-1-97 
(CodeCo 1986) would have been sufficient to confer jurisdiction 
upon the Commission to hear Applicant's claim for compensation 
for those earlier injuries. Thus, the Commission concluded that 
Kennecott must not be allowed to escape liability by its alleged 
failure to give notice to the Commission. 
However, the Commission's contention that notice under 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-99 (CodeCo 1986) is sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction upon the Commission would completely nullify 
any effect to be given to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-100 (Codeco 
1986), and thus defeat the legislative intent and the purpose of 
the statute. Following the Commission's position to its logical 
conclusion, the Commission would have automatic jurisdiction and 
authority over every industrial accident, whether or not an 
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Accordingly, Kennecott requests the Court to set aside 
that portion of the Commission's Order which imposes liability on 
Kennecott to compensate Applicant for the percentage (61.5%) of 
Applicant's total combined impairment that relates to its inju-
ries between September, 1961 and November 1976. 
II. THERE EXISTS NO FACTUAL BASIS UPON WHICH THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COULD SUPPORT A FINDING 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT APPLICANT 
HAD COMPLIED WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS 
UNDER SECTIONS 35-1-99 AND 35-1-100 WITH 
REGARD TO HIS INJURIES BETWEEN SEPTEMBER, 
1961 AND NOVEMBER, 1976. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-85 (CodeCo 1986), which 
governs the duty of the Commission to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, provides, in pertinent part: 
. • . The findings and conclusions of the 
commission on questions of fact shall be 
conclusive and final and shall not be subject 
to review; such questions of fact shall 
include ultimate facts and findings and 
conclusions of the commission, . • . 
Utah Code Ann, Section 35-1-84 (CodeCo 1986) limits the review of 
the findings and conclusions of the Commission by this Court, 
That provision provides, in pertinent part: 
. . • Upon such review the court may affirm 
or set aside such award, but only upon the 
following grounds: 
(1) That the commission acted without or in 
excess of its powers; 
(2) That the findings of fact do not support 
the award. 
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to making an award of compensation for those injuries* In order 
for the Commission to have reached the conclusion that Kennecott 
was liable for Applicant's injuries between September, 1961 and 
November, 1976, or for any portion of a later injury attributable 
in any part to those prior injuries, the Commission was required 
to have made a finding of fact, based on substantial evidence 
reviewable by this Court in the record, that Applicant complied 
with the notice requirements under Utah Code Ann, Sections 
35-1-99 and 35-1-100 (CodeCo 1986). 
In the instant matter, the Commission made findings of 
fact only with regard to the fact that Applicant sustained, among 
others, injuries between September, 1961 and Novemberr 1976. The 
Commission, however, had made no findings of fact as to whether 
the employer or the Commission received notice of Applicant's 
injuries between September, 1961 and November, 1976. Indeed, 
there exists, as a matter of law, no factual basis upon which the 
Commission could have supported a finding of fact that Applicant 
complied with the notice requirements with regard to those 
injuries. Consequently, the Commission has properly not reached 
the legal conclusion that Applicant gave notice to the Commission 
that complied with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. Sections 
35-1-99 and 35-1-100 (CodeCo 1986). The Commission, neverthe-
less, has reached the legal conclusion that Kennecott bears legal 
liability for Applicant's injuries between September, 1961 and 
November, 1976. Liability could not be imposed on Kennecott with 
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fact and the i nnr "liis ion of lav which form the premises for 
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A p p l i c a n t h a s n e v o r p u r s u e d dim iiwnuii ol c o m p e n s a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e 
C o m m i s s i o n f o r t -hos^ i n i u r i e * ' " Mm p r o c e e d i n n b e f o r e t h e 
Comr i riF 11M|, A | | 1 " > " I ' " ' " " < » h >c) ^ I I S J t it1 , I i * " i o s %j i n j u -
r i e s which he s u f f e r e d between 19 b b and 197b and, t h e r e f o r e , 
App l i can t Linn! no r e a s o n t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e in in "omm i«-, s i mi 
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ry/h is arbitral y and capricious and should be set aside by thi s 
Court. 
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Furthermore, the failure of the Industrial Commission 
to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether 
Applicant satisfied the notice requirements under Utah Code Ann. 
Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100 (CodeCo 1986) is reversible error. 
The Commission has the duty to make findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law on all issues of material fact before it. Utah Code 
Ann. Section 35-1-85 (CodeCo 1986). This requirement is manda-
tory and may not be waived. Failure on the part of the Commis-
sion to make findings of fact that resolve all issues of material 
fact necessary to justify the conclusions of law and order 
entered thereon is reversible error. Parks v. Zions First 
National Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983); Kinkella v. Bauqh, 
660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 
1338 (Utah 1979). The Utah Supreme Court in Rucker aptly 
observed: 
The importance of complete, accurate and 
consistent findings of fact in a case tried 
by a judge is essential to the resolution of 
dispute under the proper rule of law. To 
that end the findings should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts 
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached. 
Rucker, 598 P.2d at 1338. 
In the instant matter, the Commission failed to make 
findings of fact with regard to whether Applicant satisfied the 
notice requirements of Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-99 and 
35-1-100 (CodeCo 1986) to support a legal conclusion that the 
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Commission had jurisdiction by which to impose liability against 
Kennecott for Appl i can t, s i n j u r 1»"»i I iei w n i " m c ppt embe i , I "Hi I • 1 
N c i v p f i i i b i p i , I " I ' " i n l I  i t I 11 mi i in in in > , in 11 mi i""« 1.111 II t i l v i n in i •in li mi l i m e r e q u i s i t e 
f i n d i n g s o I I a c t: i *•. 111>I in ere h armless e r r o r, Rathe r the 
Commission's failure I iniaki," the rrqiiiM1 1 I i nil i nos Il II! i I i>, 
re J't") siLiIe ei i i c'lin Il .ereiore, Hit1 C o m m i s s i o n s awanJ with 
regard to Applicant's ^juries between 1961 and 197b should be 
set aside by this Court , 
I i i EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE COMMISSION HAD SUFFI-
CIENT NOTICE OF APPLICANT'S INJURIES BETWEEN 
SEPTEMBER, 1961 AND NOVEMBER, 1976 TO INVOKE 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSION, APPLI-
CANT'S CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION WITH REGARD TO 
THOSE INJURIES IS UNTIMELY, AND THEREFORE 
MUST BE BARRED, 
The Comm i s s i o n " s F i nd i n q s f I-' I " I . v . i tr I In 
and Ofit'i ,i"..«\i i 'I i ri1] A| pi 11..111I workers 1 compensation bene! ills is 
further f I awed1 • Even assumi ng t h i s Cour L f i nds t hat f hp Commi s-
sion had "jurisdiction over Appl' 'A * n 1 »• M M l i n t e l I ' m 1 1 
11'ii" 1, i^pplicam ',  f I ci 1 1;, 11 compensation tor those injuries 1 
untimely and, therefore, is barred by the statute of limitations 
under Utah Code Ann , Se "1 :i < 1 1 3!: J! 99 (CodeC'i > J 986). 
Utah Code Ann, Section is 1 T (CodeCo 1985) clearly 
mandates that an employee must make a claim for romne",sa" ion with 
t h e Commissic 11 1 1 11 111 v 1 i in 1 1 iiii 1 1 fiu eu t IH,J 
a c c i d e n t 01 Lin- dcite of t h e idiiii payment of c o m p e n s a t i o n ;\ 
a c c i d e n t , wi th in e ight years from the ddL 
I ' 11 1 PC! , II I 1 1 111 11 1 MI compensation :* r permanent tut,a I 
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disability are subject to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-99 (CodeCo 
1986). See Mecham v. Industrial Commission of Utahf 692 P.2d 
783f 786 (Utah 1984); Buxton v. Industrial Commission, 587 P.2d 
121 (Utah 1978). Thus, failure on the part of a claimant to file 
a timely claim for permanent total disability under that provi-
sion bars recovery. 
The purpose of the limitations provision in Utah Code 
Ann. Section 35-1-99 was aptly stated in Kennecott Copper Company 
v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875f 877 (Utah 1979): 
The purpose of that statute, in common with 
all statutes of limitation, is that potential 
claims or controversy should sometime come to 
rest, and thus enable employers and employees 
to get along in peace and good will without 
controversies hovering in the wings. There 
are other valid reasons for the requirement 
that such claims should be asserted within 
some reasonable and specified time. If an 
investigation is necessary, it can be made 
promptly while the evidence and the witnesses 
are available. This is a safeguard not only 
against possible fictitious or fraudulent 
claims, for real or imagined old injuries, 
but it also calls attention to any necessity 
that may exist for remedial steps to protect 
the other employees from injury. Further-
more, the longer the period of limiation, the 
longer the employer must maintain records, 
and set up and carry reserves (or insurance), 
to take care of such possible claims. While 
the burden of the things just mentioned may 
initially appear to fall upon the employer 
(industry), it must be realized that they 
must also be borne by other workers, and 
ultimately by the public. 
Kennecott Copper, 592 P.2d at 876. Here, the Utah Supreme Court 
has reiterated important public policies regarding the salutary 
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(CodeCo 1986) and, thus, thwarts those policies. 
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i m m a t e r i a l b e c a u s e t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s for t h o s e i n j u r i e s 
e x p i r e d p r i o r t o any c l a i m i compensa t i n I i I n i h' ' Appl icant 
w i i" hi iirJ'iP (roiuiii in ss i( in i "• J i i s cussed above , t h e Utah Supreme Court 
h a s e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t where t h e employee has f a i l e d tu f i l e i 
c l a i m c -f compensa t i on wi th J in I Imn presi r ihml l i inifni innnn p n it 
t ! I e L oiirui 11 s Li uJ 11 lias no a u t h o r i t y il  o d w anI compensa 11 o n . See 
P e t e r s o n v . I n d u s t r i a l Commission, 23 Utah 7d 4 4f H I P ?d " '? ! 
(Utah 1971) ; Gardner v . 1 Fidustr l a l Conunission , i11 111 \11 I •i| , 
ii: 1 ; p . z d UZB (Utah 1 9 7 3 ) . Thun lh*j Commission s award b a s e d , 
I n pa r t , on A p p l i c a n t s i n j u r i e s between S r p t. e m be i 
November, 198 i " j , " d l n ' n k ' M i t a t i 
t h e r e f o r e , s h o u l d be s e t a s i d e by t h i s C o u r t , 
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e i i mmiss ion had no ant hoi i | , in HI i 
] i a b i l i t j on ii'U mum on n in \\d\ compensa t ion t o r A p p l i c a n t ' s 
i n j u r i e s between September
 t I ' d , | nnd N o v e m b e r , .1974 R a t h e r 
t h o s e u n c o m p e n s a t e d i n j u r i e s s h c u l i l In i ei j iu'i1< in H J MI iimi 
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injuries and, therefore, are properly the responsibility of the 
Second Injury Fund. See Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-69 (CodeCo 
1986) • See also Second Injury Fund v. Perry's Mill & Cabinet 
Shop. 684 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1984); Jacobsen Construction v. Hair, 
667 P.2d 25 (Utah 1983). 
IV* KENNECOTT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN 
CONNECTION WITH APPLICANT'S WORKERS' COMPEN-
SATION AWARD, SINCE KENNECOTT HAD RECEIVED NO 
NOTICE PRIOR TO THE HEARING THAT THERE WOULD 
BE ANY CONSIDERATION OF APPLICANT'S SUBSE-
QUENT INDUSTRIAL INJURIES. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-82.51 (CodeCo 1986) pro-
vides that the Commission shall give notice and an opportunity to 
be heard to all parties whose rights may be affected by a compen-
sation award: 
Hearings shall be held by the commission upon 
reasonable notice to be given to each inter-
ested party, . . . All parties in interests 
shall have the right to be present at any 
hearing, . . . and to present such testimony 
as may be pertinent to the controversy before 
the commission and shall have the right to 
cross-examine. 
Utah law clearly establishes that an order of an 
administrative agency issued without sufficient notice to 
affected parties is violative of due process guaranteed under the 
Federal and State Constitutions. Morris v. Public Service 
Commission, 7 Utah 2d 167, 321 P.2d 644 (1958); Fuller-Toponce 
Truck Co. v. Public Service Comm.
 f 99 Utah 28, 96 P.2d 722 
(1939); Denver & Rio Grande Western Railway Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 74 Utah 316, 279 P. 612 (1929). In Morris, the Utah 
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Supreme Court set n^ide an order nf the Public Service Comxnissioi 
("PSC" I cancelling a rert if irate of rnnvcnionce and necessilv i I 
I'lcrri4 ' " " ' 1 ii duSP ' -L 1 dlfi ltd partiei* w«i 
constitutionally hlective In lint matter, Neil Morris rioirni 
business r*s Ma r fian Delivery Servitt , i I ' » fj ' " ' i '"' " i 
mi dlt ii in M illinium Lairier, and In assume the operating 
rights i Robert Wat sen1 <!< \\ *\ business as Be i w<* > Moving 
Company nndei a vain! M M ifii mi i iiii I i intuit I I II I I M I 
hearing * h u h stated H M I i IK Commission would address th 
application »' *»• Morris wN> > • <• * 1 req nested H ' *"'rt 1 f i cate to 
assume I In i [i* i nf in i i IIMJIII I I 1 i in i I Wn1 <un ' linai inq was 
held, II il subsequent thereto the PSC entered its Findings of la 
and Conclusions of law and determined thai tin 'mler sfinni l nil I 
ii l Ii h j" i " | I " I'M i I i rr is 'i assume the 
certificate held hi Robert Watson hi I hi same time the PSf 
cancelled the certificate held I , ' .> • M I >l I Im 
il hi(-> riiled hilliiout proper notice and without due proceM i l 
law cancelling Mr, Watson1 s certificate,, tt ic I Itah Supreme 
Court, setti nq A I: I dP t h e adr i i :i: i :i s 1 1 at i :i , s tated: 
In the instant matter the notice given by the 
Commission provided only that an application 
of Neil R. Morris for a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity and to assume the 
operating rights of Robert Watson would be 
entertained by the Commission. The issue of 
unqualified cancellation of the certificate 
which Watson held was not before the Commis-
sion. The Commission has attempted to 
utilize the evidence in the hearing proper 1v 
before it to order the cancel 1 at ion [of * 
Watson certificate], not properly before the 
Commission, 
Morris. 7 Utah 2d at 170-171, 321 P.2d at 646. 
This principle of due process applies equally to 
proceedings held by the Industrial Commission. In Denver & Rio 
Grande Western Railway Co. v. Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 316, 
279 P. 612 (1929), the Industrial Commission proceeded to amend 
its findings of fact without giving the railroad company the 
opportunity to offer additional evidence. In remanding the 
amended findings of fact of the Commission, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
Notice and an opportunity to be heard are 
elementary requirements of due process of law 
when the rights of a party are to be affected 
by judicial proceedings. [Citations omit-
ted.] Our Workmens' Compensation Law, infer-
entially at least, provides that the commis-
sion shall give notice and an opportunity to 
be heard to all persons whose rights may be 
affected by its award. [Citation omitted.] 
Indeed, if the Legislature should enact a law 
dispensing with notice and an opportunity to 
be heard to a party whose rights will be 
affected by an award of the commission, such 
law should be a nullity. 
Denver & Rio Grande, 74 Utah at 319, 279 P. at 612-613. 
In the instant matter, the notice of hearing given by 
the Commission related solely to Applicant's claim for compensa-
tion for an injury that occurred on September 21, 1961. The 
issue of Kennecott's liability with regard to Applicant's inju-
ries between September, 1966 and June, 1984 was not before the 
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Commit Kennecott 
] :. . iwdi:. - combined rpt,rne"t "hat rela*f^ • 
those n-uries. In so 4 —•- - . • •> r* - r * -; - *--
t - taring ....
 h. .* liability 
on Kenneco* f
 r-;-a " * J •. **-^  «-**^ e _rtc a.;i -^_ ..-;, 
properly *, 
I uommis-^,. intended *~ address the issje :~r 
Kenne :ot " liabil; * -«.* applicant 5- * ~* £* between 
1966 and ^ 
informea *- ^ „-..,. grounds s -r iiabilit vas 
sought Although K-*- ^ ** •-- repress* e* at the *• * 
r - i enneco^ ...*., 
if any -^x* trT A:; «: .r e've--" L?f- ai ' 
Kenneco* advised by tnc not: -
i - i pres^nf '. t - m g solel 
regar: tc Applicants St?;*er;-ti ~: injury, •  * - :•*-*• 
advised by -:* ^ r- • -
- , . . .nprepare^ present 
pertinent - aler, -• _ defenses -.* connection with 
Applicant 
The impos i t ion of 1 i abi 3 i t y cum Kennecott for 
Applicant's injuries between 1966 and 1984 was without di le 
° Furthermore, for the reasons stated in Sections 1 and II •" 
above, the Commission did not have jurisdiction to address 
Kennecottfs liability with regard to Applicant's injuries between 
September, 1961 and November, 1976. 
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process of law as guaranteed under both the Federal and State 
Constitutions. The Commission acted without authority and beyond 
its jurisdiction. Accordingly, that portion of the Commission's 
Order that pertains to Kennecott's liability with regard to 
Applicant's injuries between September, 1966 and June, 1984 
should be set aside by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Applicant filed a claim of compensation for his Septem-
ber 21f 1961 injury. The Notice of Hearing given by the Commis-
sion related solely to Applicant's claim for compensation for the 
1961 injury. The Commission, nevertheless, made a finding of 
liability against Kennecott with respect to Applicant's injuries 
between September, 1961 and June, 1984. Applicant never filed 
timely notice of his injuries between September, 1961 and Novem-
ber, 1976 with the Commission and, with the exception of the 
September, 1961 injury, nor has Applicant filed a claim for 
compensation with the Commission with regard to those injuries. 
Thus, the Commission lacked jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100 (CodeCo 1986) to make any award for 
compensation to Applicant in connection with his injuries sus-
tained between September, 1961 and November, 1976. 
Even if Applicant had sought to be compensated now for 
those earlier injuries, there exists simply no factual basis upon 
which the Commission can support a finding of fact that the 
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Commission had adequate notice of Applicant's injuries between 
September, 1961 and November, 1976 to confer jurisdiction upon 
the Commission over those injuries. 
Furthermore, even assuming that this Court finds that 
the Commission had adequate notice to confer jurisdiction for 
Applicant's injuries between 1961 and 1976, the Commission's 
award of compensation relating to those injuries is nevertheless 
improper because Applicant's claim for those injuries, having 
never been filed timely, is barred by the statute of limitations 
under Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-99 (CodeCo 1986). 
Finally, that portion of the Commission's order that 
imposes liability on Kennecott for Applicant's injuries between 
September, 1966 and June, 1984, without prior notice to 
Kennecott, is made without due process of law as guaranteed by 
the Federal and State Constitutions. 
Accordingly, Kennecott requests that this Court set 
aside the Commission's award for workers' compensation benefits 
to Applicant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3olff day of June 1987. 
WM4r. 
JA^IES w: ELEGANTE 
gXL J./POS 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Kennecott Corporation 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing docu-
ment to the following on this 3e:tU day of June, 1987: 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 5800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-5800 
David L. Wilkinson, Esq. 
Ralph Finlayson, Esq. 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
236 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Erie V. Boorman, Esq. 
Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 5800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-5800 
Angelo Maldonado, 
2363 Green Street, No. A 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
298:061287A 
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APPENDIX A 
35-1-99 NOTICE OF INJURY AND CLAIM FOR COMPENSA-
TION — LIMITATION OF ACTION — TOLLING 
PERIOD FOR FILING CLAIM. 
When an employee claiming to have suffered an injury in 
the service of his employer fails to give notice to his employer 
of the time and place where the accident and injury occurred, and 
of the nature of the accident and injury, within 48 hours, when 
possible, or fails to report for medical treatment within that 
time, the compensation provided for herein shall be reduced 15%; 
provided, that knowledge of the injury obtained from any source 
on the part of the employer, his managing agent, superintendent, 
foreman, or other person in authority, or knowledge of any asser-
tion by the injured sufficient to afford an opportunity to the 
employer to make an investigation into the facts and to provide 
medical treatment is equivalent to this notice; and no defect or 
inaccuracy in the notice subjects the claimant to this reduction, 
if there was no intention to mislead or prejudice the employer in 
making his defense, and the employer was not, in fact, so misled 
or prejudiced. If no notice of the accident and injury is given 
to the employer within one year after the date of the accident, 
the right to compensation is wholly barred. If no claim for com-
pensation is filed with the Industrial Commission within three 
years after the date of the accident or the date of the last pay-
ment of compensation, the right to compensation is wholly barred. 
However, the filing of a report or notice of accident or injury 
with the Industrial Commission, the employer, or its insurance 
carrier, together with the payment of any compensation benefit or 
the furnishing of medical treatment by the employer or an insur-
ance carrier, tolls the period for filing the claim until the 
employer or its carrier notifies the employee, in writing, of its 
denial of liability or further liability for the industrial 
accident or injury, with instructions upon the notification of 
denial to the employee to contact the Industrial Commission for 
further advice or assistance to preserve or protect the 
employee's rights. The claim for compensation in any event shall 
be filed within 8 years after the date of the accident. 
APPENDIX B 
35-1-100 DUTY OF EMPLOYEE TO FILE NOTICE OF ACCI-
DENT WITH COMMISSION — COPY TO EMPLOYER 
— TIME LIMITATION ~ JURISDICTION OF 
COMMISSION, 
Whenever an employee sustains an accident arising out 
of or in the course of his employment, the employee shall file 
with the commission, in writing, notice of such accident, with a 
copy to the employer; if such notice is so filed within three 
years of the time of the accident or within the time limitation 
provided in section 35-1-99, the commission shall obtain juris-
diction to make its award when the injury becomes apparent. 
APPENDIX C 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case Nos. 85000374 & 86000654 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
ANGELO MALDONADO, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
KENNECOTT 
(SELF-INSURED) and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. 
FINDIN 
CONCLUSIONS 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334f Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August 20, 
1986, at 8:30 o'clock a.m.; same being pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
Angelo Maldonado, PRO SE. 
Kennecott was represented by Laurie Priano, Personnel 
Benefits Analyst. 
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Erie V. 
Boorman, Administrator. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Administrative Law 
Judge notified the parties that since the Applicant had previously filed an 
Occupational Disease Claim for hearing loss, that thai claim would also be 
joined in the Applicants Claim for Permanent and Total Disability Benefits. 
By way of explanation, the Applicant originally filed an Application for 
Hearing Loss based on harmful industrial noise encountered while at Kennecott. 
The Application was set for hearing and heard before Judge Martinez of the 
Commission on January 9, 1986. The employer, Kennecott, fully defended the 
matter and as such has been accorded their due process rights with respect to 
the Applicant's hearing loss claim. After the matter had been submitted to a 
Medical Panel by Judge Martinez, the Panel entered its Report dated March 17, 
1986. However, before the Medical Panel Report could be distributed to the 
parties, Mr. Maldonado contacted the Commission and requested that his hearing 
loss claim be withdrawn. Accordingly, on April 8, 1986, Judge Martinez caused 
a letter to be written to the parties indicating that the hearing loss claim 
had been withdrawn and was dismissed without prejudice. 
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Just prior to the Dismissal of the Hearing Loss Claim, the Applicant 
filed an Application for Hearing claiming disability benefits for an 
industrial accident he sustained at Kennecott on September 21, 1961. This 
claim was assigned Case No. 86000654, and was heard by the undersigned on 
August 20, 1986. At that hearing, it became clear that although the Applicant 
was without the benefit of legal counsel, that his claim was a claim for 
permanent and total disability. It also became evident that not only had the 
Applicant sustained an industrial injury on September 21, 1961, but that he 
had also sustained industrial accidents on September 22, 1966, January 21, 
1971, November 16, 1976, March 6, 1980, November 18, 1982, April 26, 1983, and 
June 20, 1984, all while employed by Kennecott. Following that hearing, the 
Administrative Law Judge caused the Medical Panel Report concerning the 
Applicant's hearing loss to be distributed to the parties. The parties were 
advised that they should file Objections to the Medical Panel Report or that 
the same would be admitted into evidence. 
In that Report, the Medical Panel had concluded that the Applicant 
was exposed to hannful industrial noise at Kennecott, and that "this is his 
only source of noise exposure/' The employer responded to the Panel Report 
indicating that the Commission had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the hearing 
loss claim. This position is clearly not supported by the law which provides 
the Commission with continuing jurisdiction to modify prior findings. 
Further, the Defendant, Kennecott, was notified at the hearing of August 20, 
1986, that the Admininstrative Law Judge would be considering all of the 
Applicants injuries and claims at one time so as to minimize continual 
litigation. Further, since the employer had retired the Applicant because of 
his hearing loss, it was apparent that that hearing loss was significant 
enough to have some bearing or effect on the Applicants claim for permanent 
and total disability. In addition, since the hearing loss claim had been 
dismissed without prejudice, it was abundantly clear to the Administrative Law 
Judge that more than enough jurisdiction existed to reopen that claim 8nd 
adjudicate the same in light of the Applicant's permanent and total disability 
claim. The employer also took the position that the only claim properly 
before the Commission was that involving an alleged industrial accident in 
1961. In that respect, the employer contended that since they had failed to 
file any Employer's First Reports of Injury, that the Commission was thereby 
foreclosed from exercising jurisdiction over the Applicant's claim. This 
position of the employer is fallacious and incorrect, which will be explored 
later in this Order. 
Thereafter, the claim was referred to the Division of Rehabilitation 
Services for their evaluation after the Administrative Law Judge had made a 
tentative finding that Mr. Maldonado was permanently and totally disabled. 
The Division submitted its report indicating that the Applicant was not a 
feasible candidate for rehabilitation and retraining. Kennecott then objected 
to that Report of the Division of Rehabilitation Services, and taking their 
independent rehabilitation counselor's report out of context, contended that 
the Applicant was a candidate for rehabilitation and retraining. Yet, the 
bottom line of the report from Mr. Heal is that MMr. Maldonado is not a viable 
ANGELO MALDONADO 
ORDER 
PAGE THREE 
candidate for vocational rehabilitation presently, and would not be unless his 
physical activity level is increased in some way to allow him to participate 
in vocational rehabilitation.•• It is also interesting to note that Kennecott 
concluded that the Applicant could not perform or be retrained to perform any 
other job within the bargaining unit, and so, he was given a permanent total 
medical retirement effective October 1, 1985. Following receipt of Kennecott1s 
Objection, the file was in a posture for the issuance of an Order, when the 
Administrative Law Judge reviewed the file further and determined that a 
Medical Panel evaluation would be needed to determine the extent of the 
Applicant's impairment due to his industrial accidents at Kennecott. 
Thereafter, the file was referred to the Medical Panel for its evaluation. 
The Medical Panel Report was received and copies were distributed to the 
parties. No objections having been received to the Medical Panel Report, it 
is admitted into evidence. Being fully advised in the premises, the 
Admininstrative Law Judge is prepared to enter the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Angelo Maldonado started working as a laborer for Kennecott in 1961, 
when he was eighteen years of age. He originally started out as a laborer and 
was able to work his way up to the job of a puncher, which required that he 
keep the air vents under the furnace cleared. On September 21, 1961, Mr. 
Maldonado was working on the number two convertor, going up a walkway when he 
slipped on oil slick and fell, twisting his back and then striking his low 
back and neck on the metal platform. The evidence on the file clearly 
indicates that the Applicant was taken to the Kennecott Clinic, where he 
reported his injury to the medical assistant, who faithfully reported in the 
records that the Applicant was hurt on the job. The Applicant was given an 
ice lolly on his back and neck and he was also given Percodan. He stayed at 
the Clinic all of that day and was then told to return to the Clinic the 
following day. He did so, and his timecard was turned in by the Clinic daily 
for approximately two weeks so that he could continue to receive his regular 
pay. The daily treatment received by the Applicant consisted of Percodan and 
lying around the Clinic. After this course of treatment, Mr. Maldonado was 
placed on -light duty", where he sat around the coffee room for another week 
and a half. 
Thereafter, the Applicant was able to perform some work. Since he 
was still complaining, his employer sent him to Dr. Kuhe on December 27, 
1961. Dr. Kuhe took x-rays of the Applicant and indicated that his problem 
was non-industrial. Mr. Maldonado was then referred to Dr. Boyd Holbrook for 
an orthopedic consultation, and in March of 1962, the Applicant was given a 
lumbosacroal brace, which he was told to wear at all times. He was also given 
msucle relaxants and pain killers. He continued to have spasms in his back at 
that time. On May 3, 1963, Mr. Maldonado received a cortisone injection in 
his back. 
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On September 22, 1966f Mr. Maldonado sustained another industrial 
accident. As contained in the Kennecott medical records, it indicates that 
••fell on job and caught self with left arm - now has pain in left back and 
left arm." It further indicates that the Applicant received an injection and 
was having some subscapular pain. In 1963, the Applicant was involved in an 
automobile accident when a lady ran a stop sign and struck his car on the 
right front passenger side. As a result, the Applicant was shaken up and 
experienced some spasms in his back, but lost no time from work. 
On January 21, 1971, the Applicant was working on the number three 
convertor, when a plank fell and struck him on his hard hat, with the result 
he sustained a neck injury and was treated with traction in the company clinic. 
Again, this history was faithfully reported in the employer's medical records 
kept by the Wasatch Medical Group, which had been retained by Kennecott to 
provide medical services to their employees. The Applicant was x-rayed at 
that time and the reports indicate the same was negative for a fracture or 
dislocation. On July 19,1973, the Applicant reported to the Wasatch Medical 
Group and their office note indicates that he had an old fracture of his 
fourth lumbar vertebra with an old fracture of his coccyx. The Applicant's 
next injury occurred apparently on November 7, 1976, when he fell down some 
stairs and landed on some ice. The Applicant was treated by Dr. Brasher, a 
company physician, and was released to return to work on November 16. 1976. 
Mr. Maldonado was then injured on March 6, 1980, when he fell on the 
west crane landing, twisting his left knee according to his testimony. 
However, the medical records of the company clinic would seem to indicate that 
the right knee was injured. Mr. Maldonado was examined by Dr. Coda and was 
given ice. 
On November 18, 1982, the Applicant injured his back while lifting 
cables on the east crane platform. He and a fellow employee were lifting the 
cables when the other employee lost his grip, giving the full weight to the 
Applicant. He reported to the company clinic and was seen by Dr. Reese who 
.diagnosed a muscle strain of the lower back on the left side. Mr. Maldonado 
was fiven an ice lolly massage and he was also given Darvocet and Soma. He 
was able to continue working at Kennecott and had no further problems until 
April 26, 1983. On that date, as he was getting out of a truck, his left leg 
gave way and his right knee was twisted. He reported to the company clinic 
where he was examined and an ace wrap was applied along with ice. At that 
time, he was diagnosed as having a possible strained ligament. 
On June 20, 1984, Mr. Maldonado and a co-worker, were lifting a forty 
pound motor which was to be installed in a screw conveyor. As they were 
carrying the motor up two flights of stairs, the Applicant's left leg gave out 
on him and he fell down a few of the stairs and wrenched his back in the 
process. He reported his injury to Dr. Reese and was then sent to Dr. Lamb by 
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Kennecott. He was temporarily and totally disabled for the period June 21, 
1984, through July 2, 1984. He then returned to work on July 3, 1984, and 
continued working. 
On January 2, 1985, the Applicant reported to Dr. Reese with 
continuing back pain, and at that time, the doctor advised him not to lift or 
climb, which he could not avoid in his job. He last worked for Kennecott on 
March 31, 1985. At that time, he was taken off the job by Kennecott and was 
given a permanent and total disability pension based on severe hearing loss. 
He was certified for his retirement as of March 31, 1985, but the actual 
pension benefits do not commence until six months subsequent to that date, 
which explains the October 1, 1985, date previously indicated hereinabove. 
Kennecott relied on the impairment rating given by their medical expert, Dr. 
Sonkens, which indicated that the Applicant had a 35% binaural hearing loss or 
a 12% whole man impairment due to industrial noise while employed by Kennecott. 
Although that was the basis of the permanent and total disability, the records 
should also reflect that the Applicant was suffering from degenerative disc 
disease and retropatellar chondritis of both knees. Dr. Reese concluded that 
the Applicant was permanently and totally disabled as the result of spinal 
stenosis and retropatellar cohondritis of both knees, however, the final 
retirement was based on the Applicant's severe hearing loss resulting from his 
exposure to industrial noise while employed by Kennecott. As indicated 
previously, the medical panel convened by the Industrial Commission to 
evaluate the Applicant's ^earin^ loss found that he had a 7.5 percent binaural 
hearing loss or a(3% impairment)of the whole person. 
With the file in this posture, the case was referred to a Medical 
Panel for ^valnaHnn pf the orthopedic injuries. The Panel found that the 
Applicant has "a (foi permanent^  partial impainnent Jo f the whole person due to 
low back problems. The Panel concluded that as a result of the original 
industrial accident of September 21, 1961, the Applicant sustained a 15%) 
permanent partial impairment, and that he has a QjC} impairment of the whole 
person due to the industrial injury of September 22, 1966, a (Z^TJpermanent 
partial impairment due to the industrial accident of November 16, 1976, a (iy 
impairment of^the whole person due to the industrial injury of Novemer 18, 
1982, and a fTv impairment of the whole person due to the industrial injury of 
June 20, 19847 The Panel also found a (4y impairment of the whole person due 
to arthritis in the Applicant's knees as a result of pre-existing conditions. 
The Panel also found that there was no impairment due to conditions existing 
before September 21, 1961, and that the industrial accident of November 18, 
1982, did not aggravate a pre-existing condition other than the prior 
industrial accident of 1961, and the Panel made the same finding with respect 
to the industrial injury of June 20, 1984. With respect to the industrial 
accident of April 26, 1983, the Panel found that this industrial accident 
caused only a temporary aggravation of the Applicant's chronic progressive 
degenerative knee condition. The Administrative Law Judge adopts the findings 
of the Medical Panel as his own. 
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At the present, the Applicant's daily routine consists of some 
reading on a very limited basis, since he is unable to sit for more that ten 
or fifteen minutes. He has constant spasms and throbbing pain in his back, 
and he is able to climb some stairs and can walk for a limited distance. 
On October 31, 1986, the Social Security Administration entered its 
decision that the Applicant was permanently and totally disabled. While not 
binding on the Administrative Law Judge, it is evidence of the extent of the 
Applicant's disability. As previously indicated, Kennecottfs own evaluator, 
Alan Heal, found that the Applicant was not a viable candidate for 
rehabilitation training, as did the Division of Rehabilitation Services as 
required by Section 35-1-67, Utah Code Annotated. Accordingly, the 
overwhelming preponderance of the evidence on the file clearly supports a 
finding of permanent and total disability as the result of his industrial 
accidents and his occupational hearing loss claim. Accordingly, the 
Applicant is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits. Although 
the law is somewhat unclear in this area, it would appear to the Administrative 
Law Judge that the permanent total disability award should be based on the 
compensation rate in effect at the time of the Applicant's last industrial 
injury of June 20, 1984, which will entitle him to the maximum compensation 
benefits of $255.00 per week for 312 weeks. 
Finally, the Defendant, Kennecott, has urged that the Applicant's 
claim be dismissed for permanent and total disability for the reason that the 
Commission file contains no Employer's First Reports of Injury for any of the 
industrial accidents. This case involves a situation where the self-insured 
employer, Kennecott, was clearly aware of the industrial accidents of Mr. 
Maldonado since he reported them to their dispensary, and they were faithfully 
recorded by the dispensary personnel. Therefore, Kennecott had the burden of 
submitting both the First Report of Injury and the first medical report, 
neither of which were filed for the Applicant's industrial injuries. The 
Applicant had no reason to file any type of Application for Hearing or other 
request for litigation with respect to his injuries, since Kennecott paid him 
his benefits and provided the medical care that ho needed. For Kennecott to 
now argue that they should not be liable for benefits because they did not 
give the required legal notice to the Commission is an attempt by Kennecott to 
take advantage of its own failure to comply with their legal responsibilities. 
The Administrative Law Judge will not allow Kennecott's failure to comply with 
the law to work or redound to their benefit. Therefore, the Administrative 
Law Judge finds that Kennecott is estopped from raising this defense. 
There being no permanent aggravation of the pre-existing knee problems 
by the industrial accidents, the Administrative Law Judge finds tha^ there is 
/ no Secon* Tnjurv FuT>d partiripa* \on indicate^- Accordingly, Kennecott shall 
be liable for the initial permanent and total disability award, which shall 
commence effective April 1, 1985. Pursuant to Section 35-1-67, the Second 
Injury Fund will then commence permanent and total disability benefits to the 
Applicant at that same weekly rate effective March 25, 1991. 
ANGELO MALDONADO 
ORDER 
PAGE SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Angelo Maldonado is permanently and totally disabled as the result of 
his industrial accident at 'Kennecott and his occupationally caused hearing 
loss. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Kennecott pay Angelo Maldonado 
compensation at the rate of $255.00 per week for 312 weeks for a total of 
$79,560.00, as compensation for his permanent and total disability resulting 
from his industrial accidents and occupational hearing loss at Kennecott. 
These benefits shall commence effective April 1, 1985, with accrued amounts to 
be paid in a lump sum including interest of 8% per annum from April 8, 1985, 
until benefits are made current. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Second Injury Fund place Angelo 
Maldonado on their payroll effective March 25, 1991, with benefits to be paid 
at the rate of $255.00 per week for as long as the Applicant shall live or 
until further order of the Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review^ appeal. 
TimothvPy Allen 
AdniiTrTstr^ tive Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
j& day of January, 1987, 
Commissioiv^Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on January I If . 1987, a copy of the attached 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the case of Angelo 
Maldonado, issued January / ^  1987, was mailed to the following persons at 
the following addresses, postage paid: 
Angelo Maldonado, 2363 Green Street, #A, SLC, UT 84106 
•Laurie Priano, Kennecott, P. 0. Box 525, Bingham Canyon, UT 
84006-0525 
Erie Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By. 'JL 
Wilxia 
APPENDIX D 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case Nos. 85000374 & 86000654 
ANGELO MALDONADO, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
KENNECOTT 
(SELF-INSURED) and/or 
SECOND INJURY FUND 
Defendants. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
DENIAL OF 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
On or about January 14, 1987, an Order was entered by an Administra-
tive Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in the above 
entitled case. 
On or about February 11, 1987, the Commission received a Motion for 
Review from the Defendants, Kennecott, by and through their attorney. 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for 
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission 
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion 
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the Administra-
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge of January 14, 1987, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the 
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
1987. 
<|§il 
,inda J. S 
Commissio 
L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on March l& 1987, a copy of the attached 
Denial of Motion for Review in the case of Angelo Maldonado, issued 
March (p 1987, was mailed to the following persons at the following 
addresses, postage paid: 
Angelo Maldonado, 2363 Green Street, //A, SLC, UT 84106 
Laurie Priano, Kennecott, P. 0. Box 525, Bingham Canyon, UT 
84006-0525 
James M. Elegante, Atty., P. 0. Box 11898, SLC, UT 84147-0898 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By. 
Wilma 
